Avicenna's Notion of Fitriyat : A comment on Dimitri Gutas' interpretation

Abstract

In an illuminating article, Dimitri Gutas has tried to show that Avicenna's theory of knowledge should be understood within a full-blown empiricist framework very similar to that of John Locke.¹ Gutas' argument is based on an analysis of Avicennian 'principles of syllogism"² (mabadi al-qiyas). The principles of syllogism are those judgments and propositions that form the irreducible and axiomatic foundations of syllogisms and definitions.³ Avicenna categorizes these principles based on how we accept and acknowledge the truth (tasdiq) of them. This categorization appears, with some slight modifications, in many places in Avicenna's oeuvre, for example in the Kitab al-Burhan of al-Sifa,⁴ and the logic parts of al-Nagat⁵ and al-lsârât wa-l-tanbihat⁶ According to al-Nagat, the principles of syllogism are divided into sixteen types based on the cognitive mechanisms through which we grasp them.'