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Title: | Non-lnnate A Priori Knowledge in Avicenna |
Authors: | Zarepour, Mohammad Saleh |
Keywords: | Empiricism Avicenna Dimitri Cutas Syllogism |
Issue Date: | 2020 |
Series/Report no.: | Philosophy East & West;Vol.70, No.03 .- P.841-848 |
Abstract: | In his "The Empiricism of Avicenna" Dimitri Cutas interprets Avicenna as an empiricist.¹ He analyzes Avicennian 'principles of syllogism' and claims that none of them are a priori. Moreover, regarding awwalïyat and fitrïyat - which are two groups of such principles-Gutas suggests that "[i]t appears that both kinds of propositions would be analytic, in Kantian terms. As for Locke, they would be what he called 'trifling.'"² In my first comment in this issue, I disagreed with this view and argued that these two groups of propositions are a priori in the Kantian sense. Assenting to their truth is internal to the intellect and independent of empirical information. I also argued that at least some fitrïyat are synthetic, rather than analytic. So Avicenna's epistemology accommodates instances of non-analytic knowledge that are independent of sense experience. |
URI: | https://dspace.ctu.edu.vn/jspui/handle/123456789/69429 |
ISSN: | 0031-8221 |
Appears in Collections: | Philosophy East and West |
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