Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://dspace.ctu.edu.vn/jspui/handle/123456789/69437
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dc.contributor.authorWenzel, Christian Helmut-
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-02T08:32:53Z-
dc.date.available2021-12-02T08:32:53Z-
dc.date.issued2021-
dc.identifier.issn0031-8221-
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.ctu.edu.vn/jspui/handle/123456789/69437-
dc.description.abstractA representation represents something, and it is something by itself. A drawing of a tree represents a tree. A photograph represents a person. The drawing and the photograph were made to do so. They have this function, and you can hold them in your hand. A dog might not understand their representational function, but human beings usually do. They understand the intention and they see the likeness. The ringing of an alarm clock can represent that it is 7 a.m. now and that you should get up. You understand that, because you set the alarm yourself. But there is no likeness between the sound of the alarm clock and the information that you should get up now. There is no likeness comparable to the likeness between the drawing of a tree and the tree. Still, it is a representation of some sort. The ringing stands for something. The crucial point is the intention. The drawing, the picture, and the alarm were intended to represent and "tell" us something.vi_VN
dc.language.isoenvi_VN
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPhilosophy East & West;Vol.71, No.01 .- P.13-37-
dc.subjectMindvi_VN
dc.subjectRepresentationalvi_VN
dc.subjectIntroductionvi_VN
dc.subjectOverviewvi_VN
dc.titleHow Representational Is the Mind? Introduction and Overviewvi_VN
dc.typeArticlevi_VN
Appears in Collections:Philosophy East and West

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